Introduction

In the introductory chapter it was suggested that one of the most striking developments in eleventh and twelfth century England was the rapid ruralisation of the Conquest military knights, and their subsequent transformation from a military rank with specialised professional duties into a social or economic class with diffuse administrative and seigniorial obligations. The very fact of enfeoffment under the special circumstances of the Conquest broke the actuarial cycle and allowed the knights to develop along lines which were essentially non feudal and eventually anti feudal, urged on by Plantagenet kings who saw political advantages in soliciting the cooperation of the rural middle class.

Nevertheless the military characteristics of the knights were never entirely submerged by their other interests and as we have already seen there was a significant group of knights for whom military service was a demonstration of status which aligned them with the barons rather than those lower down the social scale. In times of stress, however, Edward I was all too ready to place heavy military burdens on men whose military capabilities might be little more than nominal. Whilst it might be possible to agree with Powicke that the king regarded the knights of the counties as warriors, [1] amongst other things, it is doubtful whether most of the rural knights considered themselves as such, though they might well have carried arms, both real and heraldic, as an outward sign of their social status and lineage. For many, however, practical military service at the level of proficiency and equipment expected of a professional knight was almost certainly beyond their reasonable means. The reluctance of many knights to serve for any length of time, clearly evident in the crisis of 1297, merely hastened the replacement of reluctant feudal levies by purely contract armies. In this respect, as in others, the reign of Edward I was a period of adjustment and definition during which time the king stretched the feudal machinery to its limits whilst simultaneously relying, as previous kings had done, on mercenary forces and experimenting with the new procedures of contract armies and indentures. The right to bear arms as a consequence of status was no guarantee of proficiency in their use, nor did the increasing cost and sophistication of armour encourage the gentry to invest in the new equipment required to bring them into line with contemporary military expectations, especially if such equipment was rarely to be used in anger. The Earl of Surrey's rusty sword might well have served as a defence of his ancestral legal rights, but he was unlikely to carry it into battle. For the less well endowed country knights attempting to fight professionals without current professional equipment was likely to be a dangerous game. Many of the nascent gentry, then, were little better than amateur soldiers in an age when even erstwhile professionals like Luke de Tany could be conspicuously incompetent or inexperienced. [2]

So far as the gentry were concerned the chief modifications undertaken by Edward consisted of a progressive redefinition of the criteria of knight service, from an obligation based entirely on feudal tenure, to an obligation based both on tenure and status. This redefinition began with the first orders for distraint of knighthood  in the reign of Henry III, and culminated, temporarily, in the catastrophic summons of 1297 which ordered all landholders with incomes greater than £20 per annum to serve abroad as knights and precipitated a constitutional crisis which demonstrated, amongst other things, the extent of gentry hostility to the fiscal and military burdens which Edward was placing on them. The detailed changes in military obligation which took place during the course of the thirteenth century have been extensively discussed by M.R. Powicke and need not concern us here but the general policies need to be discussed. [3]Two basic expedients were adopted by Edward. Firstly he continued for a while the practice of distraint of knighthood on twenty and forty pound [librate]landholders and defined the obligations and conditions of knighthood in the Statum de Militibus, dated around 1278, at the very beginning of his reign. This expedient was double edged in so far as it cannot easily be determined whether distraint of knighthood was intended to increase the actual obligation to cavalry service, or merely to apply the fiscal obligations of knighthood both to those men who actually held knight's fees, either in chief or mesne, and also to those socage and freehold tenants who were considered wealthy enough to assume the fiscal or military burdens of knighthood. One effect of this policy, already considered, was to facilitate entry into an officially recognised class through wealth alone, whilst conversely, it is equally clear that the gentry did not regard the Exchequer's interpretation of the obligation to knighthood as a necessary condition of knightly status. So far as the barons were concerned the potential opening up of the knight class to wealth alone, together with Edward's attempt to create a national militia, may have accelerated the absorption of the military and chivalric concepts of knighthood into the baronial persona thus allowing them to distance themselves from the emerging lesser aristocracy.

In practice distraint of knighthood afforded the king three possible varieties of service. Firstly, actual cavalry service in the field properly armoured and supported, secondly scutage, traditionally paid in lieu of military service, or fines for the respite of such service. Such a system was probably adequate to meet the limited military pressures of the last part of the reign of Henry III, and the relatively relaxed military operations against the Welsh in the first part of the reign of his son. Since it fell only on those who held land owing knight service it preserved the fiction that only men of knightly status were liable to knightly obligations. Under pressure Edward began to supplement conventional distraint of knighthood with the third expedient of imposing a direct military summons on specified rental groups irrespective of their terms of tenure. In the Welsh campaign of 1283 the essential need was for fully armed knights with great horses rather than mere belted knights fighting on rouncies. Those who did not have great horses were allowed to compound for their service. [4]The ability to fight with a dextrarius, or great warhorse might therefore be taken as an implied index of status. Later writs, in 1285 and 1292 returned to simple ordered for the distraint of knighthood falling on those with 100 librates [pounds]of land in 185, falling to 40 librates in 1292 where those lands were held in fee and heredity.
 

When things began to get really difficult from 1294 to 1297 Edward reverted to direct distraint of cavalry service on all 20 and 40 librators. This time there is no doubt that he wanted actual cavalry service, compensatory fines were not longer sufficient, but the level of service required might fall short of that expected from a fully armed professional knight. The continuing pressure of this service on both gentry and barons led eventually to the constitutional crisis of 1297 in which the 20 librators protested that they were being asked to pay twice for the king's wars, firstly through taxation and secondly through distraint of actual military service. The barons argued that it was not part of their feudal obligation serve abroad though they were willing to do so for pay, though, as Professor Coss has pointed out most were willing to serve at their own expense for campaigns within the British Isles, either because they considered it beneath their dignity to accept pay or because to do so would imply 'an unacceptable degree of subordination' [5]. As a result Edward bought off the barons and conceded that the non feudal levies should be paid for their service. The question of military obligation became submerged in the more general dispute over tallages and aids, culminating in the reissue of the Charters and rumbling on into the Articuli super Cartas in 1300. [6]Complaints by mesne tenants about the scale of military obligation imposed by Edward are thus fairly well established and were embodied in a preliminary draft of the Articuli which emphasised the place and duties of mesne tenants in the military hierarchy;
 

'that the community of knights and other 'gentlemen' of the realm who have the summons of £40 of land request that those who do not hold of the king in chief should be released if it pleases him; in as much as they are advised that their tenements are defended by those who hold them, and those who hold them in chief of the king perform their service for them, and for their tenants, in all places where they owe service.' [7]

This grievance was not expressed in the final version of the Articuli, but Edward did change the writ of summons in 1300 from one of command to one of request and offered to pay. [8]All of this provides a significant insight into the attitudes of the gentry as distinct from those who considered themselves to be genuine knights for whom a willingness to serve was a matter of honour. [9] For the rest there was clearly a genuine reluctance to do practical military service coupled with an evident ability to make their views known and to turn the strict terms of obsolete feudal obligations against the king. Edward persisted without much success in trying to impose cavalry service, albeit at pay, on the £20 landholders. After 1302 he abandoned this policy and returned to the earlier expedient of distraint of knighthood with its contingent fiscal obligations rather than attempting to coerce reluctant amateur warriors into the field. It is clear that he had failed, as Powicke says, ' to find a balance between compulsion and contract'. [10]In the face of this impasse the next stage of military development would be the transition from mixed feudal, household and non feudal forces, composed in small part of unwilling gentry, to purely contract armies, attracting those who wished to serve professionally at the king's pay and excusing those who did not.. Contract armies were not a significant feature of Edward's military policy, though they were used, but they became the standard method of raising troops in the fourteenth century and contributed substantially both to the enhancement of militaristic knighthood and to the constitutional conflicts of the fifteenth century.
 

Two further general points may be made. Firstly the transition from a feudal to a general obligation to cavalry service under Edward I was consistent both with the economic realities of the late thirteenth century, and with the changed characteristic of the gentry class. Cavalry service was no longer seen by most as the primary obligation of knighthood. It was merely another duty, occasional and supplementary to the duties of local government and parliamentary representation. Significantly, the increasing burden of military service aroused much more opposition from the gentry than did the increasing obligations of government service, though it must be added that the former was intended to be mandatory whilst the latter was apparently optional. Moreover, the application of the 20 and 40 librate rule for distraint of knighthood and contingent cavalry service may have concentrated unwanted military obligations onto a relatively narrow section of the local gentry. Military, judicial and administrative burdens fell on these men not so much because they were knights but because they were believed to have the economic means to perform the services expected of them by the king. Paradoxically the adoption of contract armies in the very changed economic conditions of the fourteenth century reopened the door for impoverished county knights to seek their fortunes on the battle field and remerge into the higher aristocracy as professional soldiers and military captains.

Secondly, the underlying themes of the constitutional confrontations with Edward I, apart from their impact on the history of Parliament, demonstrate that the increasing burden of military service may have proved intolerable to men who were otherwise well disposed to the crown. Quite apart from the physical hardships and dangers of campaigning the middle range of knights was often paying twice for the king's wars, firstly through the subsidies and aids which they themselves granted in parliament, and collected in the counties, and secondly through that complex paraphernalia of distraint of knighthood, scutage, respites, fines or, in extremis, through their own personal service. Occasionally the king remitted taxes or scutages to individuals who served in person, but such remissions were often retrospective, and by no means universal. In practice many knights undoubtedly avoided military service, but the buzones class was intrinsically more liable to such service than others, and because they were well known in the county, and probably no less well known to the Exchequer, these men were also less able to avoid it. On the other hand the 20 and 40 librators were politically significant constituting, almost by definition, the law-worthy and discreet men of the shires. Their parliamentary activities, however passive, offered opportunities for common and informal discussion which helped to unite them as a group and, in association with the barons, allowed them to express common opposition to excessive royal demands on their time and wealth. In short the new military obligations may well have fallen most heavily on that section of the county community which was most likely to offer political resistance on a national level, especially when it also suited the interests of the magnates .

So much for a brief summary of the general military developments of the reign. The theme is that of steadily increasing pressure, firstly on purely feudal resources and secondly on quasi feudal resources, through distraint of knighthood as an obligation falling both on tenure and income, and thirdly on economic resources, through the distraint of the 20 and 40 librate groups to perform cavalry service at their own expense. The present chapter does not propose to challenge the thesis of M.R. Powicke, or to examine the development of Edward I's military policies in detail. It is concerned only with assessing the actual pressure of military service falling on the knights in the Essex sample as a guide to their status in the pecking order of knighthood.

Most of the evidence for the military activities of the knights comes either from Palgrave's Parliamentary Writs and Writs of Military Summons, or from the various Household, Exchequer and Chancery records relating to military service, including proffers of service, Muster and Horse Rolls, Wages of Household Knights and letters of protection. The former consist mainly of summonses to military campaign but do not establish that those summoned actually turned out. The latter, reinforced by the Close and Patent Rolls, testify, directly or indirectly, to the actual presence of individual knights at specific campaigns. As might be expected the two sets of sources are not always compatible since knights known to have received a summons can rarely be shown to have attended, whilst there is evidence that knights who did attend campaigns did not always receive a summons. For those knights who did see war as a way of life and an opportunity for recognition and reward a formal summons was barely necessary. On the other hand the 20 and 40 librators, and others, were summoned under blanket orders issued through the sheriffs or commissioners of array as in the combined parliamentary writ and writ of military summons to the sheriff of Northampton in 1282:
 

'And you shall not presume, through favour, reward, fear, or any other consideration, to grant pardon or postponement to anyone of your bailiwick who has lands worth £20 and is fit and able to bear arms.'[11]

The Nature of the Military Summons.
 

During the period 1277 to 1306 Essex knights were summoned to nine military campaigns and three military councils. In addition there is evidence of some knights attending campaigns in 1300 and 1303 to which they had not been individually summoned, and three Essex knights were specifically excluded from the general summons in 1294 for tenants in chief to serve in Gascony.[12]The summonses to each of these three campaigns was in some sense general. That of 1294 fell on all tenants in chief, summoned through the sheriff. In 1300 Commissioners of Array were empowered to summon all 40 librate landholders, and by 1303 popular resistance had obliged Edward to revert to the general summons falling on all owing either knight or serjeanty service with the significant proviso 'que cest otroy et graunt ne courge a vous ne a vos heyrs en prejudice'. [13] Individual summonses survive for the remaining campaigns within the period 1277 to 1306, subject to a variety of conditions. Those summonses for which names are available fall into two main categories. Firstly there are a number of idiosyncratic summonses. Two of these are not really summonses at all, but proffers of service made in July 1277 and August 1282 for the Welsh campaigns. [14]In the latter case the proffers of service were contingent on two earlier writs of summons. The first of these requested, but did not command, the service of all tenants in chief, [15]whilst the second limited service to those having great warhorses, and allowed other to compound financially for the service due. [16]The third summons in this category was the ill fated summons of July 1297 requiring 20 librators to muster at Dover in order to serve in Flanders, the spark that ignited the 1297 crisis and led to the Confirmation of the Charters. In this case the summons was general, issued through the sheriff, who then returned the names of all the 20 librators to be discovered in his bailiwick, there being no list for Essex or other East Anglian counties.
 

The second category of summons consisted of direct requests for service addressed to individuals in faith and love, or, in faith and homage or, more brutally, rogamus. In one case those so summoned were offered wages [17]but in general no reward was offered other than the honour of fulfilling one's duty to the king.
 

In addition to summonses addressed to individuals there were, of course, a number of general summonses issued through the sheriff or the Commissioners of Array which were directed at well defined rental groups. These were generally of the same kind as the July 1297 summons, except that the names of those summoned are not recorded. There were, in fact four such summonses, not counting that of 1297. Firstly a general summons was issued to all 20 librators to attend a Muster in November 1283, which appears to be analogous to the Military Councils to be discussed in due course. [18]Secondly, in February 1295, 40 librators were summoned to serve with horses and arms at the king's pay [19]Thirdly , Commissioners or Array were ordered in October 1297 to levy knights and valetti to serve at the king's pay, [20]and, lastly, a general summons was issued to all men of suitable estate to serve at the king's wages in June 1299. [21] There is no evidence that the knights from the Essex sample attended these campaigns, but it cannot be assumed ex silencio that they did not do so.

This second category of summonses required practical military service, consequent on economic status, or a fine in lieu of such service. Over the same period writs were issued nationally and to some individual counties ordering either distraint of knighthood or distraint of arms falling on the same 20 and forty librate groups. Five writs of this kind were issued between 1277 and 1306. In 1278, 1285 and 1292 the 20, 100 and 40 librators were respectively requested to take up knighthood, but by 1306 the king had retracted sufficiently to enjoin knighthood only on those who wished it, and to provide arms for them out of his own pocket. [22]In 1282 the 30 librators had been required to provide themselves with horses in readiness for the king's command, but this imposition was later relaxed. [23]
 

Taken overall the documentation is disappointing, since general writs, which might reveal the most about the possible pressure on the gentry are, in many case, less than helpful. The twenty one summonses between 1277 and 1306 can be roughly divided into ten feudal or individual summonses, five orders for distraint of knighthood, and five orders for distraint of service from specific income/rental groups. There was, in addition, one general summons to all men at arms. Some names are available for only ten out of these twenty one forms of summons.
 

The Pressure of Military Service in general.

In default of satisfactory returns to the general writs for distraint of knighthood or service, any attempt to analyse writs and returns in gross is doomed from the start. The individual writs of summons, on the other hand, do provide a priori evidence for a limited class of tenants, mostly tenants in chief, who may not be typical. There is, moreover, some reason to believe that actual attendance on the battlefield was higher than the writs of summons might lead one to believe. In spite of the confusion between summon and performance these writs amply demonstrate the apparently increasing pressure on the rural middle classes. Even in the case of individually named writs the numbers summoned rise sharply after 1296, reaching a maximum in 1301, which suggests that individual writs could also be addressed to knights who were not tenants in chief. In practice these unquantifiable pressures may have been more apparent than real.

It is important to distinguish between distraint of knighthood, which created possible obligations for the future, from distraint of service which imposed immediate duties for impending campaigns. Thus, whilst there were eleven instances of distraint of knighthood or military service between 1283 and 1306, practical service was required on only five occasions, namely, the muster of 20 librators at York and Northampton in 1283 which was combined with quasi parliamentary assemblies, the summons to 20 librators to serve abroad in 1297, a general summons to all qualified men to serve for wages, mustering in Carlisle in June 1299, and an order for 40 librators to muster at Carlisle in June 1300 to serve again at the king's pay. The six remaining orders were anticipatory, enjoining specific income groups to take up knighthood, or to acquire horses and arms in readiness for possible service at some unspecified time in the future. The writs were rarely more specific than in 1295 when the librators were ordered to prepare themselves for a military summons at three weeks notice. [24]Moreover, the five instances of practical service can be reduced to three by excluding the 1283 muster at Northampton and York, which was more in the nature of a financial colloquium than a military event, and the summons of 13th October 1297, which was selective rather than general. The three remaining orders all fall within the crisis period 1297, 1299 and 1300, and only one of these, for July 1297, required service without pay, though pay was eventually conceded. [25]

The most significant gentry element in the 1297-1301 crisis probably consisted of those who were also tenants in chief and therefore liable to an individual summons which might be difficult to avoid. Individual Essex knights were affectionately requested for military service no less than ten times between 1277 and 1306, nor is there any reason to think that this group was exempt from the obligations falling on the 20 and 40 librators to which they might also belong. Thus, whilst the majority of the gentry might have escaped with a mere three summonses for practical military service, and some harassment over distraint of knighthood, the tenants in chief, in the worst of all possible worlds, might have been required to serve thirteen times, or more, reinforcing the earlier point that military obligations probably fell on a narrower range of the gentry and one which was already involved in other judicial and administrative duties. Thus it would seem that military pressure on knightly tenants in chief was probably more significant in this period than the imposition of hypothetical and apparently unenforceable obligations in the gentry as a whole. From the point of view of the king pressure on individuals was bound to be more effective than pressure applied to nebulous groups of potentially liable but unidentified landholders. This kind of hardship might well have been common to both knightly tenants in chief and other mesne tenants of comparable status, but only the tenants in chief could legitimately claim to be oppressed by real military service as opposed to the fiscal exactions which irritated and occasionally inflamed the rest of the county community. The Monstraunces of the barons in 1297 very clearly argues that tallages, aids and prises have so impoverished the community that many no longer have the means sustain themselves or to work their lands, so that they could not afford either military service or a pecuniary aid. [26]This protest, however embellished, does point toward the real fears and interests of the gentry, amongst whom the knightly tenants in chief were probably both the most influential and the most oppressed.
 
 
 

Military Councils
 

The knights who were liable to military service were also liable to attend military councils, and since they were normally asked to come with horses and arms it seems likely that such councils were intended as a prelude to real military action. Excluding the 1283 council which was clearly rather different kind, being conflated with an Edwardian experiment in regional parliaments, there were four military councils summoned during this period. Firstly at Gloucester on the 15th of July 1287, at Winchester in the 21st November 1294, at Rochester on the 8th September 1297, and with Prince Edward, 'wherever he might be in England' on the 22nd of September 1297. [27]

These military councils merit some attention since it has been suggested that they may have influenced the development of other forms of representative institution. [28] The analogy is flawed because such assemblies were more akin to the various colloquia called by Edward which are themselves distinct in character and purpose from his parliaments. The already mentioned military council at York and Northampton might come near to bridging the gap between a colloquium and a parliament since the writ of summons was combined, but the other four councils appear to have been exclusively military. However, a very considerable number of knights from all counties were summoned to the two assemblies of the 8th and 22nd of September 1297, and the character of those summoned from Essex suggests that this council may have had political as well as military objective. Altogether forty four knights were summoned from Essex, ten for the 8th, and thirty four for the 22nd. Nineteen of these came from the sample, in the proportion of eleven from Groups A and B, and eight from groups C and D. Two of the Essex knights attending the Council on the 22nd of September later attended the Parliament of the 6th October 1297, in which the Charters were confirmed. [29]Not all of the Essex knights summoned to these councils were tenants in chief, though most were, and several of them did not perform any other detectable military service, including the Earl of Oxford's associate John de Wascoil, who might have been expected to have military interests.[30]

On the other hand these councils were clearly selective, both in terms of the individuals summoned, and the counties from which they were summoned. One hundred and sixty nine knights were summoned individually to the 8th of September council, together with fifty four knights specifically summoned from the counties of Buckingham, Essex, Herts, Cambridge, Sussex and Suffolk. This is more than would normally be expected to make up the county element in a conventional parliament.. On the 22nd of September only forty nine knights were summoned, but thirty four of these were from Essex. It is tempting to think that these councils had some relationship with the political struggle over the Confirmation of the Charters, with the Regency Council sounding out gentry opinion, perhaps seeking the support of the knights of the home counties as a counterbalance to the Earls as Rothwell once suggested [31] . In one sense this may be true because such an assembly of knights could not be prevented from voicing their opinions to each other and discussing both war and politics. Those summoned were required to come with horses and arms, in itself a potential threat to law and order, but also an indication of an alternative purpose. Edward must have been well aware from the events of his father's reign of the dangers inherent in calling assemblies of armed men so it must be assumed that he expected these meetings to be fully under his control. The generality and uniformity of the summons, especially in respect of Essex which seems to have predominated in the second council, seem to cut across potential political divisions. It is more likely that these councils were genuinely military in purpose, concerned with the defence of the sea coast and the military administration of the counties in the face of increasing domestic unrest and possible external threats.
 

The Pressure of Military Service on Individuals.

Although it is evidently very difficult to quantify the general pressure of military service on the gentry class, it is possible to establish with some accuracy the pressure of service on individuals, bearing in mind that the receipt of a summons did not necessarily guarantee that the recipient would appear on the field of battle, or vice versa. In principle the penalty for avoiding distraint of knighthood could be forfeiture [32], and although the writs of summons do not normally specify any penalty for non performance, it may well be that failure of tenants in chief to turn out when commanded would lead to automatic forfeiture. The distinction between a command and a request was one of the grounds by which the barons in 1297 denied their obligation to serve abroad. That penalties could be enforced is demonstrated by the case of the Essex resident knight John de Wateville whose lands and goods in Essex were ordered to be seized and his body arrested, because he had left the king's army without permission.[33] Wateville, however, had responded to a summons, though the summons itself has not survived, or was never recorded. His offence was not failure to respond but apparent desertion once enrolled. It is probably that pusillanimity in the field was regarded as a greater offence than not turning up in the first place. Greater men than Wateville fell foul of the king for leaving the field of battle, and some, like Stephen Seagrave, [34] found themselves the subject of a parliamentary enquiry. At all events the military summons would be ridiculous if it was not backed up by some form of sanction, so it may be assumed, with some reservations, that those knights who were unfortunate enough to be summoned individually and by name would tend to appear at the muster when required. It would be uncharitable tp assume that all knights wished to shirk their military duties. The majority probably accept their duty rather than face dishonour and others, especially those on the borderlines of the baronage, may have jumped at the opportunity to fight for the king. However, even if we assume that those summoned individually would normally respond to the summons, it did not follow that they would necessarily attend in person. In some instances, such at Hugh le Blount [A] in 1277 and 1282, and John de Beauchamp of Fifield [A] in 1303, relatives or substitutes went in their place. [35]Alternatively knights might serve as substitutes for others, like John de Wauton [A] who served in 1277 in place of Robert FitzWalter, baron of Little Dunmow, no less. [36] In many other cases it is possible to establish actual service through the evidence of grants of protection to individuals whilst serving the king, or respites from taxation, purveyance or scutage granted in recognition of services performed.
 

In gross, of the forty two knights in the sample all but Twinstead [B], Morel [C] and Barew [C] were either summoned to, or performed, some form of military service during the reign of Edward I [37]and over the combined reigns of Edward I and II, all but Morel and Twinstead, were summoned to perform some military service. In effect, therefore, virtually all of the knights in the sample were expected to do some form of military service at some stage in their lifetimes, even if it consisted only in attending a military council. On the other hand, the necessity for military service was contingent on the king's political and strategic objectives. In the best of all possible worlds rustic knights might avoid military service if there was no war, but the existence of a potential cavalry force within a largely demilitarised rural society might in itself create the conditions in which such a force might be realised and put to use. Whatever other characteristics the knights had acquired by the end of the thirteenth century they had not entirely shed their military potential or their conception of duty to the king. Edward's legal policies had been especially beneficial in securing the tenurial rights of mesne tenants and allowing them to exploit their estates to their economic advantage. The least that he could expect in return was that they would equip themselves to turn out and for him on national rather than feudal grounds. If his policy had been successful it might have remilitarised the gentry as a national militia but such a policy would not be politically acceptable to the barons whose own wealth and aspirations allowed them to set the pace in military equipment and organisation at a level which most ordinary knights could not hope to emulate. In practice, therefore, the liability for military service was not spread uniformly throughout the knightly classes. Even amongst the tenants in chief, and other who received individual summonses, some knights were evidently more active, or more pressed than others. The following table shows the general distribution of services in terms of the number of know summonses or attendances per Group
 
 

These limited figures speak for themselves. Only eleven knights in the sample were summoned more than four times, compared with twenty seven summoned less than four times. These figures are put into perspective by comparison with the Group D knight, and baron by marriage, John de la Mare who was summoned or attended more than seventeen times. As in the case of the administrators the pressures fell on a narrow section of the gentry, whilst the majority appeared to escape with a relatively light burden but over four summonses the pattern becomes less regular. Three parliamentary Group A knights served between five and six times, compared with only one knight from Group C and one from Group D, the latter being John de Merk who was a professional serving in the royal Household. One of the Group A knights served on nine separate occasions. This was exceptional, but in general if we exclude erstwhile barons and Household knights the knights who were most active in the parliamentary and administrative groups were also more active as soldiers. At this point it becomes necessary to look at individual cases.
 

The most significant knights were those summoned four times or more and these were:
 
 

None of the Assessors and Collectors in Group B served more than three times, and so the group is not included in this table, nor is John de la Mare who will be considered as a special case. The eleven knights identified could all be described as above average in their military activities. Beauchamp and Bigod, though they each attended parliament once in the reign of Edward I,  took little part in local administration, either public or private, and may have had primarily military interests. Blount, Fillol and Wauton, however, were all active members of the buzone group and substantially involved in all aspects of local government. On the face of it these men could be considered to be overburdened, but that assumes that they themselves regarded such services as a burden, which may not be the case. They may, on the contrary, have considered it to be an honour and a duty which they readily accepted. Blount, it is true, occasionally sent substitutes in lieu of personal services and may have done less actual service than at first sight appears. [37]He was rewarded for his military commitment by being exempted from the lay subsidy of 1315, and was also allowed to collect scutage from his tenants for the service he had done in Wales. [38]The three most active knights in Group C, Gernon, Pratellis and Rochford, held no significant office in public administration, and all could be described as sub baronial in status following a military rather than ministerial life style. In Group D, the ostensible non residents, the very definitely resident Ralph de Coggeshall remains an enigma, tirelessly active in his own interests, avoiding public administrative duties as far as possible, but summoned four times for military service. Merk and Monteny were both attached to the Royal Household and must be considered as special cases not exactly comparable with the rest. In fact nearly all of the eleven knights identified as above average in military activities must be considered as special cases. For some of the knights in Group C military service was virtually the only public service they performed, but for those most active in this group military service may well have been their chosen way of life, a desirable and honourable lifestyle more characteristic of the baronage than the gentry. All of the six knights most active in Groups C and D had characteristics which distinguished them both from the run of the mill and from the parliamentary knights. Even within the small group of parliamentary knights who also did military service Bigod, surely a relative of the Earls of Norfolk, though by what descent is not clear, and Beauchamp, joint holder of one third of the putative barony of Aveley [39]might well have considered themselves a cut above mere country gentlemen.

Nevertheless, the military activities of even these rather superior knights pale into insignificance when compared with the demands made on even a minor baron such as John de le Mare who more than redeemed himself in the king's eyes for running off with Petronella de Montfort. John was summoned to, and almost certainly attended, some kind of military service, both at home and abroad, on no less than seventeen occasions between 1277 and 1307. It is possible, of course, that having gained the barony of Castle Combe by running off with an heiress he spent much of the rest of his life working off royal fines by serving in the army. Whatever his real status, his military activities were clearly far in excess of those performed by the average country knight and not far behind those which might be expected to a full blown baronial tenant in chief whose primary duty to the king was to fight for him.

As with the parliamentary writs of summons so some of the knights in the sample were also summoned to serve in the armies of Edward II. The pattern of summonses in the latter reign is essentially similar to that former. The majority of knights, about fourteen out of the twenty summoned after 1307, were summoned only once. Three were summoned twice, three on three occasions , one six times and one nine times, the latter two being Hugh Blount, already summoned nine times in the reign of Edward I, and William of Haningfield, summoned once in the reign of Edward I, and six time after 1307. Haningfield belongs more clearly than the others to the overlap between generations linking the two reigns, but Edward II, either through ignorance or incompetence, did not scruple to summon octogenarians when he found himself under pressure. [40] Taken over both reigns the majority of the knights in the sample were summoned between one and four times, and assuming that all responded to the summons the amount of time spent campaigning cannot have been excessive as a proportion of their total adult lifespan. By contrast about one quarter of the knights in the sample were summoned rather more frequently, nine between five and eight times, and two each summoned eighteen and nineteen times respectively. These most active knights divide along familiar lines which include on the parliamentary/administrative side Beauchamp, Fillol, Wauton and Haningfield, and the sub baronial group including Gernon, Pratellis, Rochford and Mare, all nominally resident in Essex, together with John de Merk and Arnulph de Monteny whom we know to have been Household knights.

This merely confirms the general findings of this survey which suggest that a high level of military commitment was concentrated into a small section of the county community. Whether this commitment was a consequence of feudal tenurial obligations, Exchequer pressure or voluntary enthusiasm is hard to determine. The question of response to feudal obligations in terms of knight's fees needs to be considered.
 

Feudal Military Obligations

John de Merk and Arnulph de Monteny can both be accounted for as military knights through their connection with the Household, but in practice Merk held two knight's fees of the king in chief and Monteny was said in 1302 to hold seven knight's fees of other lay lords, though his father's Inquisition Post Mortem mentions only three eighths of a fee held in chief. [41] Gernon, Rochford and Pratellis all had above average feudal commitments. Gernon owed service for four fees held in chief, Rochford owed for three, and Pratellis probably owed either two and one half or three fees. [42] John de la Mare, expressly summoned to campaigns as a baron appeared to hold one half of a fee in his own right, but owed a service of three fees by virtue of his wife's inheritance, [43]which was a modest obligation for a barony. These six knights appear to have been roughly comparable in feudal status and all would have been liable to regularly summons to military service on that basis. Only John de la Mare was regularly treated as a baron, and although Rochford's uncle was said to hold per baronium, [44]Rochford himself was always summoned as a knight. The greater military commitment of these men would thus be consistent with their above average feudal status and commitments as established tenants in chief by knight service. Apart from John Fillol, only one other knight in the sample had feudal obligations comparable with these six military knights and he was dead by 1296. [45]Most of the other knights in the sample who can be identified as tenants in chief normally held only one fee, or less, of the king. Of course, by the end of the thirteenth century the possession of a knight's fee did not necessarily imply the possession of estates and income sufficient to sustain knight service. As we have seen, John de Pratellis, who was one of the most active military knights, was also most active in disposing of his estates, though for what reason we cannot easily determine.

The same simple equation cannot be applied to explain the above average military service of the most active parliamentary and administrative knights. Only Fillol had three fees in chief, comparable with the 'sub baronial' knights [46] Blount held only one fee in chief, Beauchamp only one and a half, Wauton only half a fee, and Haningfield does not appear to have held any lands by knight service at all. [47] On the basis of nominal feudal obligations there thus appears to be a distinction between those knights who were frequently summoned because of the feudal obligations, and other knights frequently summoned for other reasons  which are not so obviously related to their tenurial status. It is also the case that the great majority of the knights in the sample were able to avoid the heaviest burdens of military service so we must assume that those who chose to turn more than four times did so willingly. In the case of the parliamentary/ administrative knights there does appear to be a correlation between public service and above average military service. These knights therefore justify more detailed discussion.

John Fillol alone satisfies both the feudal and administrative criteria for military summons, Beauchamp, however, attended parliament only once [48]and apparently performed no other functions in local government. He did hold one and a half fees in chief and was summoned eight times, with corroborated attendance at campaigns on five occasions. [49]In 1315 he was rewarded for his services by exemption from the current lay subsidy. [50] It would seem, then, that Beauchamp did turn out to fight in person and may be closer in character to the other military knights, aligning himself with a baronial lifestyle.
 

Hugh le Blount on the other hand, although summoned to campaigns no less than eighteen times, is known to have actually responded on only six occasions, and on four of these he sent substitutes and is known to have served in person on only one occasion, in 1277. [51]In 1324 he responded negatively by being absent from his estates when the sheriff delivered the writ of summons [52]Assuming that he was not less than twenty when summoned to serve in 1277, or forty one when he first attended parliament in 1298, he would have been in his late sixties by 1324 and probably not disposed to fight. Since it appears that there were several Hugh le Blounts extant in the early fourteenth century it is possible that not all of these summonses were directed at the same man. If they were it seems evident that Hugh did not chose to do military service and sent substitutes instead. We do not know what his response was to the other fourteen occasions on which he received a writ of summons to fight.
 

William de Haningfield did not attend parliament until the reign of Edward II but was active, as has been seen, in judicial commissions in the period 1295-1305. Towards the end of Edward I's reign he held a number of military commissions arraying levies in Essex [53]and may then have moved from military administration into personal military service, or continued as an administrator within the army. He was undoubtedly one of the leading local justices in Essex during the last part of the reign of Edward I, and his lack of tenurial obligations might suggest that he was more ministerial than military.
 

The last of these parliamentary knights is William de Wauton who is a more shadowy figure, if only because, like Blount, it might be difficult to distinguish him from others with the same name. Nor is it possible to establish estimated terminal dates for him, as it is for the others. In 1277 he performed the service due from Robert FitzWalter and was granted protection accordingly. [54]He served again with FitzWalter in 1303, but was summoned individually to serve against the Scots in 1314, though he should have been in his fifties by 1314 if he was in his early twenties in 1277. [55]A William de Wauton, who may or may not have been the same man, appeared also in the Household in 1281-2, in Gascony in 1295, again with FitzWalter in Flanders in the retinue of Aymer de Valence in 1297, in the retinue of Maurice de Berkeley in 1299-1300, and with Maurice de Berkely the elder in 1320. [56] It is difficult to be certain that all of these entries relate to the same man. Those for 1277, 1295 and 1303 raise no immediate problems in the sense that they do identify William with Essex through Robert FitzWalter. There is no evidence of a tenurial connection between FitzWalter and Wauton, but they both held the bulk of their estates in Chelmsford Hundred and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary a tenurial relationship cannot be ruled out. Other kinds of relationships, for example retaining fees, would be unusual at this time , and very hard to find, like looking for a needle in a field of haystacks. On the other hand Wauton may have had the same kind of relationship with FitzWalter as Wascoil and Bouser had with the Earl of Oxford, that is to say informal familiars who benefited in some way from and association with a great man. Both FitzWalter and Wauton made a recognizance of a debt to the Earl of Cornwall in 1280, and a John de Wauton, perhaps a son, appears with five others serving in the retinue of Robert FitzWalter in 1322, [57]which might suggest some kind of hereditary obligation. The Berkeley connection is even more tenuous. One of William de Wauton's ancestors, probably his father, and Maurice de Berkeley were both involved in a plea of warranty of charter in 1251-2 by which Berkeley and his wife acknowledged themselves to be tenants of William de Wauton and his wife's heirs for a tenement in Great Wendon, Essex. [58]This would not account for the later Wauton's doing service to the Berkeleys, but if the link between the families was one of marriage rather than feudal tenure then it is possible that William served with Maurice de Berkeley as a kinsman rather than a vassal and if this was the case it must be assumed that he served willingly. His association with Aymer de Valence, Earl of Pembroke, arose in all probability through the Berkeleys, who contracted in 1297 to maintain knights and troopers to serve Aymer in peace and war. [59]This particular retinue also included other notable Essex knights, namely John and Richard de Rivers, not in the sample, and another member of the Montchensey/Monteny family, William de Montchensey of Hertfordshire. [60] . The service attributed to William de Wauton in 1320 may well refer to the next generation, since William himself must have been well into his sixties by this date. William held only half a knight's fee in chief, but he held five other fees, none of them from either Fitzwalter of the Berkeleys, [61]which might make him comparable with some of the weightier knights in Groups C and D, but he was also one of the more active local administrators.

The apparently informal and atypical nature of Wauton's military service merely underlines the lack of uniformity of motives amongst the most militarily active of the Essex knights. It points also to the importance of imponderables such as personal preference, ambition, familiy connections and proximity to the court of a local lord in conditioning the attitude of local knights to military service. Individual motives for serving may have differed widely, but, with the possible exception of Wauton, these knights do not appear to have volunteered for service, since most of the danda reviewed so far comes from the evidence of writs of summons rather than proffers of service. Similarly the factors which might account for the extra service apparently imposed on these few knights differed from individual to individual suggesting an overall lack of uniformity which might be explained by the coexistence of traditional feudal methods of levying troops alongside the emerging contract methods in which William de Wauton appears to have become involved through the Berkeley retinue.
 

Service with other Knights and Lords

Although there are several instances of the king requesting and receiving the exact service due from his vassals, there is a little evidence of the knights in the sample performing services to superior lords other than the king. In addition to Wauton five other Essex knights from the sample are known to have served in the company of other knights and barons. For example Bigod, obviously well connected, served with Peter de Chauvent in 1296-7, and possibly with William de Leyburne in 1305. [62]Jollan de Duresme appears as a valettus of Hugh de St. Philibert in the Household records for 1297 and was in the Prince's contingent at Perth in 1303. [63] The parliamentary knight John de Sutton may have been a valettus of Walter de Tany in 1300, and of Henry de Bosco in 1302, [64] though he would have been in his fifties by this date, which seems a little old for a valettus. John de Pratellis was certainly in the retinue of John de Botetourt during the reign of Edward I, and John Heron served with Wauton and FitzWalter in 1303. [65]The connections between these knights are not easy to establish. In the case of Bigod and Leybourn there is some evidence of a family connection around 1277 and Pratellis was in debt to Botetourt in 1305. [66]Beyond this there is no evidence of tenurial connections between these knights and the lords in whose retinues they served. Moreover the nature of the documentation available generally precludes such evidence since the writs of summons were directed only to tenants in chief and others who were either sufficiently important to justify a direct summons, irrespective of tenure, or unfortunate enough to be on someone's little list. Evidence of a knight's service in the retinues of other lords does arise circumstantially from other sources, for instance in grants of protection or the valuation of horses brought to the battlefield which will be discussed shortly, but it did not attract the systematic attention of the central government. The opportunity to serve in purely feudal retinues may also have been rather limited by the end of the thirteenth century, whereas retained troops were just beginning to appear and might be documented only by chance. So far as the Welsh campaigns are concerned J.E. Morris identifies only five Essex Barons who collectively owed a feudal service of only nine knights but each in fact turned up for war with retinues of between eight and twenty one lances [67] , which must have been recruited from non feudal and paid resources. Indeed Essex knights with aspirations to a military career would have been hard put to find a suitable patron. Sanders, like Morris, identifies only five certain baronies in Essex, two of which were divided and the remainder held respectively by the Bohun Earls of Gloucester, the de Vers and the Brus family. Of the seven probable baronies in Essex three were held by the crown, one was divided beyond knowledge, and the remainder were held by FitzWalter, Louvain and Raimes, of whom only FitzWalter was conspicuously active within the context of the county. [68]
 

It is possible, of course, that knightly tenants in chief doing personal service to the king were placed under the aegis of the household and arbitrarily assigned to the retinues of household captains and other great men, irrespective of feudal or tenurial loyalties, if any existed. Nine of the knights in the sample were at some time in their lives associated with the King's Household, namely, Bigod, Duresme, Sutton and Wauton from Group A; Brianzon from Group B; Pratellis from Group C, and Mare, Merk J. and Monteny from Group D. All of these men had horses valued prior to, or after, one or more of Edward's campaigns., but of the nine only Merk, Monteny and Mare were in any sense regularly employed within the Household and were evidently Household knights. These three men do not appear in the retinues of others in the Horse Rolls, whereas other knights, not regularly employed in the Household, normally figure in the retinue of some other baron or banneret. In default of sufficient firm evidence it may be suggested that the retinues in which some of the gentry served were constructed not on the basis of tenurial obligation but on the basis of loose family associations of kinsmen, direct service for pay, or at the discretion of the Household officials. This is not germane to the narrower focus of the present study but there is clearly scope for more exhaustive research into the relationship between lords and retainers in the Household and Marshalcy records during the last half of the reign of Edward I.

The Valuation of Horses
 

As a consequence of their association with the Household some knights were able to have their horses valued on arrival at the muster, or before a battle, so that they might claim costs if the horse was lost in the fighting. No doubt this was a necessary insurance since the valuation rolls suggest a high rate of mortality amongst medieval warhorses. In addition to providing prima facie evidence that a particular knight actually attended the muster the Horse Valuation Rolls also indicate who that individual was serving with and the value and quality of the horses he brought with him. This in itself is a useful index of status, since medieval horses were by no means equal, but it applies only to those knights who committed themselves to battle and thus tells us very little about those who chose to stay at home. Even within this restricted group of ostensible fighting knights figures available from the Horse Rolls tend to support the same kind of tripartite social infrastructure within the knight class which has already been noted in earlier chapters.
 

Amongst those knights in the sample who did campaign with Edward I the most expensive horses were brought by the erstwhile baron John de la Mare. In 1297 he brought a horse valued at 60 marks, {£40}, and even his valettus had a horse valued at 40 marks {£26}. [69]By contrast more conventional knights like Wauton and Bigod had horses valued at 25 and 35 marks respectively, and the Household Knight and Royal Falconer John de Merk had horses valued at around 30-40 marks. [70]Duresme and Sutton, apparently further down the scale, both served as valetti and had horses valued at 8 and 12 marks. [71]Similarly, but perhaps surprisingly, Pratellis and Monteny, the latter described as miles simplex had horses valued at 8 and 7½ marks, or around £5. [72] Finally the tax collecting Bartholomew de Brianzon arrived in Wales in 1288 with a horse worth 20 marks, which was clearly well above average. [73]In and undated and defective Roll of Horses employed in Scotland during the reign of Edward I, John de la Mare was said to have had ten horses, Merk and Monteny each had three, whilst John de Beachamp of Fifield had two, both barded and all unvalued. [74]Possession of a barded or armoured {caparisoned}horse might be taken as a sign of social, or at least financial, superiority. Of the nine knights in the sample for whom this type of evidence is available only Brianzon, Mare and John de Merk brought barded horses valued at between 20 and 40 marks. Two other knights proffered horses which were not valued but were described. Firstly John de Beauchamp of Fifield offered two warhorses and one unarmed horse in 1303 in respect of the service due for one and a half knight's fees and one serjeanty fee, and two warhorses for one fee in 1322. [75] Hugh le Blount also proffered one warhorse and one unarmed horse for half a fee and one serjeant in 1303 and 1310. [76]Both of these men were knights in the middle range, above average in status and land, and in scope of activities, Beauchamp and a soldier and Blount as an administrator. Both were parliamentary knights.
 

The relative value of different kinds of horses is difficult to establish. The majority of the knights described in the Horse Rolls served with ordinary horses and rouncies, the former ranging in value from 10 to 40 marks, the latter slightly cheaper. However a fully barded rouncy might cost as much as 95 marks, and a barded warhorse or dextrarius could easily cost 60 to 100 marks or more. [77]Provisions made for the levying of warhorses in Derbyshire in 1298 fixed the rate of obligation at one barded horse for every £50 worth or rental of land, or around 75 marks. [78]
 

It would be unwise to make too much of these figures from such a restricted segment of the overall sample. The distinctions which may be made between these few knights are consistent with earlier discussion of their social and economic status. Mare was clearly superior in this as in other respects, whilst Bigod, Blount and Wauton all fit into the middle range of strenuous knights and buzones. Beauchamp was probably similar in status, but was more involved in military service than public service. John de Merk's feudal status was also probably comparable with the middle range of knights, but differs from them because of his close association with the Household. Brianzon, Pratellis and Monteny do not fit easily into the middle range and seem to be on this, as on earlier evidence, somewhere in the borderline between upper echelons of the gentry and the genuinely chivalric form of knighthood associated with the baronage.
 

Military Administration
 

Lastly, a number of the Essex knights held administrative posts which were specifically military, and which may be seen as supplementary to their other local administrative duties. Richard de Tany, well established as a military knight, was custos of the sea coast of Essex in 1295 [79]and, as we saw in the second chapter, a list of mainly local knights available for this duty was drawn up in 1296. It is possible that the formal organisation of the Essex knights for local defence may account for their absence from the ill fated national summons for £20 landholders in July 1297. If this was the case it may also explain the prominence of Essex and East Anglian knights in the military councils of the 8th and 22nd September discussed above. The council of the 22nd was attended by knights from the counties of Sussex, Suffolk, Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hertfordshire and Buckinghamshire, and, with the exception of Sussex, none of these counties returned names to the general summons of July 1297, nor, for that matter did any of the Northern counties. It seems probable that Edward's intention in 1297 was to leave the Northern and Eastern counties reposnsible for the Scottish and East coast defences respectively, whilst the knights from the remaining counties were distrained as 20 librators to serve in Flanders.
 

William de Haningfield [D], who became more prominent in Essex affairs in the reign of Edward II, was commissioned in January 1300 to summon the Essex knights to serve against the Scots. [80]This was a variation on the procedure of general summons through the sheriff, or by general writ, and it was also a step in the direction of a more specialised military administration with its own agent in the shires. Later in 1300 Haningfield was ordered to levy men at arms in Essex and return the names of the defaulters into the Wardrobe. [81]By 1311 he had become a full blown Commissioner of Array in Essex and Hertfordshire with instructions to proceed against the Scots with as many followers as he could muster. [82]The parliamentary knight William de Wauton, already noted for his informal and direct association with the Wardrobe, was appointed as a Purveyor for the army in Essex and Hertfordshire in 1306, and later as a Supervisor of Array in association with Haningfield in 1311. [83]This tends to confirm the opinion that Wauton's importance in Essex came more from his connections in the central government than from his local importance which remains rather obscure by comparison with other administrative and parliamentary knights in the sample. Lastly another parliamentary knight, John de Tany, was ordered in 1315 to raise one hundred archers in Essex. [84]
 

Most of the administrative commissions came towards the end of the reign of Edward Is, and during the early years of his son. They reflect an increasing professionalism within the Edwardian war machine in the procedures adopted for levying and organising local troops which was to come into full fruition in the reign of Edward III. More importantly for local government these procedures entailed a further devolution of authority and responsibility onto the leading men in the shires. The creation of military posts with the county organisation added a further facet to the general character of the gentry and a local outlet for the skills of those local knights who still saw themselves as primarily military in character. It was yet another means by which the local community could be bound more closely to the interests of king, or mobilized against him.

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